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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________________ 
 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 The appeal in this declaratory judgment diversity 
action raises a question of insurance policy interpretation 
whether one or both insurance companies are obligated to defend 
an action for injuries sustained at the hands of their insured. 
On June 30, 1994, an elevator operator filed suit in state court 
against Marketing Industries Group, Ltd. ("MIG") and 
Bloomingdale's, Inc. for injuries he sustained when a bed frame 
fell on his foot in the course of a delivery by MIG on behalf of 
the vendor, Bloomingdale's.  Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A. 
("Generali") provided vehicle liability coverage to MIG, a 
delivery company.  Public Service Mutual Insurance Company 
("PSM") provided MIG with a general liability policy.  Generali 
brought a declaratory judgment action in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,1 
requesting the court to hold PSM obligated to defend and 
indemnify MIG in the underlying tort action, and to find that 
                     
1Marketing Industries Group, Ltd., Bloomingdale's, Inc., and 
Willie Wiggins were parties to the action.  These parties did not 
appeal the district court's order. 
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Generali's policy did not obligate Generali to defend MIG in the 
tort suit.2   
 The district court found that the Generali and PSM 
insurance policies provided concurrent coverage to MIG for the 
pending tort litigation.3  PSM timely appealed the court's order 
to the extent that it obligated PSM to defend MIG in the 
underlying suit.  Generali did not appeal the court's order.  We 
reverse the judgment of the district court insofar as it 
obligated PSM to defend MIG in the underlying tort action.  
 
I. 
 
 On July 23, 1992, MIG deliverymen delivered a bed, 
purchased at Bloomingdale's, Inc., to a condominium building in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  The deliverymen transported the bed, 
via the freight elevator, to the purchaser's apartment on the 
19th floor of the building.  As the MIG deliverymen moved the bed 
from the elevator into the 19th floor hallway, the bedframe fell 
on the foot of Willie Wiggins, the elevator operator.  Wiggins 
sued MIG and Bloomingdale's alleging that MIG employees 
negligently caused the bed frame to fall on Wiggins's foot, 
resulting in severe and permanent injuries. 
                     
2The parties agreed that there were no factual issues in dispute 
and requested the court dispose of the declaratory judgment 
action through Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment.        
3The district court properly exercised diversity jurisdiction of 
the declaratory judgment action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We 
may hear the appeal as a final order of the district court. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 At the time of the Wiggins incident, MIG held insurance 
policies with both Generali and PSM.  The Generali policy covered 
the maintenance and use of trucks and motor vehicles.  The policy 
stated, in relevant part: 
  A. Coverage 
 
We will pay all sums an "insured" legally must pay 
as damages because of "bodily injury" or "property 
damage" to which this insurance applies, caused by 
an "accident" and resulting from the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a covered "auto".4 
  (A. 389) 
 After Wiggins served MIG with his complaint, Generali 
assigned defense counsel to represent the interests of MIG, but 
reserved its rights under the policy.  PSM, however, denied any 
obligation to defend or indemnify MIG in the tort suit under its 
general liability insurance.  The policy provided exclusions, 
which stated, in relevant part: 
 
2. Exclusions 
 
  This insurance does not apply to: 
 
   .        .           . 
 
g. "Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance, use or 
entrustment to others of any aircraft, "auto" or 
watercraft owned or operated by or rented or 
loaned to any insured.  Use includes operation and 
"loading or unloading". (A. 413).5 
                     
4The Generali policy contained several exclusions, including an 
exclusion for property moved by mechanical device.  Generali 
argued that the mechanical device exclusion should apply in the 
Wiggins action because the deliverymen were using the freight 
elevator.  The district court rejected this argument, and 
Generali did not appeal the court's order.  
5The policy provided the following definition of "loading and 
unloading": 
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 PSM argued that the court should read the term "use" of 
an auto in the Generali policy broadly to include the 
transportation of the bed between the vehicle and the final place 
of delivery, the purchaser's 19th floor apartment.  Further, PSM 
asserted that the court should apply the broad reading of the 
term "use" to the PSM exclusion clause, and thus conclude that 
PSM is not obligated to defend MIG. 
 The district court applied the broad definition of 
"use" to the Generali policy, and found that Generali was 
obligated to defend MIG.  It declined, however, to extend the 
definition to PSM's exclusion clause.  The court construed the 
exclusion narrowly, and held that it applied only to the 
unloading of the truck to the front door of the apartment 
building.  Thus, the court found Generali and PSM to be co-
insurers of MIG.  
 
II. 
                                                                  
 
7.  "Loading or unloading" means the handling of      
property: 
 
a.  After it is moved from the place where it is 
accepted for movement into or onto an aircraft, 
watercraft or "auto"; 
 
b.  While it is in or on an aircraft, watercraft or 
"auto"; or  
 
c.  While it is being moved from an aircraft, 
watercraft or "auto" to the place where it is finally 
delivered; but "loading or unloading" does not include 
the movement of property by means of a mechanical 
device, other than a hand truck, that is not attached 
to the aircraft, watercraft or "auto".(A. 419) 
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 The district court's grant of summary judgment is 
subject to plenary review.  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 
(3rd Cir. 1993); see also Electric Ins. Co. v. Rubin, 32 F.3d 
814, 815 (3rd Cir. 1994) (district court's interpretation of 
insurance contract subject to plenary review).  The parties agree 
that New York state law controls the insurance policy 
interpretation.  
 The leading New York case interpreting the terms 
"loading and unloading" in an insurance policy is Wagman v. 
American Fidelity and Casualty Co., 304 N.Y. 490, 109 N.E.2d 592 
(1952).  In Wagman, the defendant insurance company issued a 
policy to a motor carrier which covered claims for damages 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the carrier's 
vehicles.  The policy provided that "use of the automobile for 
the purposes stated includes the loading and unloading thereof." 
Id. at 492.  
 When faced with the task of interpreting the policy, 
the court noted that policies defining "use" as including 
"loading and unloading" have been subject to both narrow and 
broad interpretations.  It stated: 
The broader construction, adopted in a majority of 
the jurisdictions which have passed upon the 
question, is that "loading and unloading" embrace, 
not only the immediate transference of the goods 
to or from the vehicle, but the "complete 
operation" of transporting the goods between the 
vehicle and the place from or to which they are 
being delivered.   
   
Id. at 494. (citations omitted) 
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 The court favored the "complete operations" doctrine  
 
over a narrower construction of the terms, asserting: 
 
The [broad] view impresses us as sounder, as more 
fully carrying out the aim of the policy to cover 
the entire operation of making commercial pickups 
and deliveries in the business of the insured 
carrier and, indeed, the courts in this state have 
already signified their approval of it.  
   
Id. (citations omitted) 
 In the instant case, the district court noted New 
York's pragmatic adherence to the complete operation doctrine. 
Thus, it found that the Wiggins claim fell within the scope of 
Generali's policy coverage.  The court refused, however, to apply 
the Wagman definition of "loading and unloading" to the exclusion 
clause in PSM's policy.  It asserted that, under New York law, 
exclusions in insurance policies must be construed narrowly.  See 
Seaboard Surety Company v. Gillette Company, 64 N.Y.2d 304, 311, 
76 N.E.2d 272, 486 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1984) (exclusions from policy 
coverage are "not to be extended by interpretations or 
implication, but are to be accorded a strict and narrow 
construction.").   
 The court found the language of the exclusion clause to 
be ambiguous: 
It is not clear whether this exclusion concerns 
the moving of the bed frame to the Building or to 
its final position within the purchaser's 
apartment, or somewhere in between.   
 
 
Applying a narrow construction, the court determined that the PSM 
policy only excluded coverage of the move to the apartment 
building.  Because Wiggins's injuries occurred after the MIG 
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employees moved the bed into the building, the trial court held 
PSM obligated to defend MIG in the Wiggins suit. 
 We do not believe that New York law warrants the 
district court's distinction between insurance clauses and 
exclusion clauses.  New York courts have applied the Wagman 
interpretation of the terms "loading and unloading" to both 
insuring and exclusion clauses.  See Broome County Co-Operative 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life and Casualty Co., 75 Misc.2d 587, 347 
N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Edmund Mayer Inc. v. Aetna Casualty 
and Surety Co., 62 Misc.2d 82, 308 N.Y.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1970); 
see also Cenven, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 842, 
362 N.E.2d 251, 393 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1977) ("It would be unwise to 
proliferate fine distinctions from and exceptions to the now 
judicially determined language 'loading and unloading.'"). 
 The district court relied on Muller v. Sun Indemnity 
Co. of New York, 96 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1950) and General Accident 
Insurance Company v. United States Fidelity and Guarantee 
Insurance Company, 193 A.D.2d 135, 602 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1993) to 
support its decision to apply a narrow interpretation to PSM's 
exclusion clause.  We believe that the court's reliance on these 
opinions is misplaced.  The Muller decision preceded the New York 
Court of Appeals decision in Wagman.  Further, General Accident 
was based on Muller and makes no reference to the Wagman 
decision.   
 We conclude that the Wagman decision dominates New York 
law on the interpretation of "loading and unloading."  It 
requires that this court in the instant case interpret "loading 
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and unloading" broadly to include movement of the bedframe from 
the delivery truck to the place of final delivery, the 
purchaser's 19th floor apartment.  Thus, the Wiggins claim falls 
squarely within the scope of PSM's exclusion clause, and PSM is 
not obligated to defend MIG in the tort action. 
 
III. 
 
 Although the district court's holding that PSM was 
obligated to defend MIG relied upon a narrow construction of 
PSM's exclusion clause, it provided an alternative rationale for 
its holding.  The court noted: 
 
While the parties do not address the issue, the 
court notes that an Endorsement to PSM's general 
liability policy (document titled New York 
Changes-Amendatory Endorsement, CG 01 63 04 86) 
provides that: 
 
3. Any definition of "loading and unloading" 
does not apply. 
 
If this endorsement is applicable, as it appears 
on its face to be, then the claimed injuries 
clearly fall within the coverage of PSM's policy. 
(order at 10 n. 3). 
 
 The district court apparently found that, because the 
endorsement deletes any definition of "loading and unloading" 
from the PSM policy, the "loading and unloading" exclusion does 
not apply to the Wiggins action. 
 PSM contends that the endorsement eliminates the 
definition of "loading and unloading" in the policy, leaving New 
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York state law to define the terms.  We believe PSM's argument is 
persuasive.  The most logical interpretation of the endorsement 
is that it refers to the definition of "loading and unloading" 
contained within the policy.  In the absence of an agreed upon 
meaning, the parties are bound by New York state law.  Thus, 
under the "complete operation" doctrine as set forth in Wagman, 
PSM's exclusion clause applies to the Wiggins action.  
 
IV. 
 
 In summary, under New York state law, the court must 
apply the "complete operations" doctrine to the interpretation of 
the terms "loading and unloading" in an insurance contract.  This 
broad interpretation applies to both insurance and exclusion 
clauses.  PSM's policy excludes coverage for incidents arising 
from the use, including loading and unloading, of a vehicle. 
Thus, under Wagman, PSM is not obligated to defend MIG in the 
Wiggins action. 
 Further the court's alternative conclusion that PSM's 
Amendatory Endorsement rendered the PSM exclusion inapplicable to 
the Wiggins action is in error.  In the absence of a definition 
of "loading and unloading" in the policy, the court must apply 
New York state law.  Thus, the PSM exclusion clause applies to 
the Wiggins suit.   
 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court, 
insofar as it obligates PSM to defend MIG in the Wiggins action, 
will be reversed.  Costs taxed against Generali. 
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